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Abstract
According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argu-
ment (NMA) is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is
therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only
applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other version, which
resembles the form in which the argument was initially presented by
Putnam and Boyd, remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We
provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show
that it is valid. Finally, we demonstrate that the use of subjective
priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show
that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can
be dispelled.
1 Introduction
The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is arguably the most influential argu-
ment in favour of scientific realism. First formulated under this name in Put-
nam (1975), the NMA asserts that the predictive success of science would
be a miracle if predictively successful scientific theories were not (at least)
approximately true. The NMA may be framed as a three step argument.
First, it is asserted that the predictive success we witness in science does not
have any satisfactory explanation in the absence of a realist interpretation of
scientific theory. Predictive success is often understood (see e.g. Musgrave
1988) in terms of the novel predictive success of science. It is then argued
that a realist interpretation of scientific theory can provide an explanation
of scientific success. Finally, abductive reasoning is deployed to conclude
that, given the first two points, scientific realism is probably true.
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All three steps of NMA were questioned already shortly after its formulation.
It was argued that scientific success needs no explanation beyond what can
be given in an empiricist framework (van Fraassen 1980), that scientific
realism cannot provide the kind of explanation of predictive success aimed
at by the realist (Laudan 1981) and that the use of abductive reasoning in a
philosophical context already presumes a realist point of view (Fine 1986).
The debate on all these points continues until this day.
In the year 2000, Colin Howson presented an interesting new line of criticism
(Howson 2000) that did not look at one of the three individual steps of the
NMA but questioned the overall logical validity of the argument. Howson
argued that a Bayesian reconstruction of the NMA revealed a logical flaw
in the argument’s structure: it commits the base-rate fallacy. Howson’s line
of reasoning was followed and extended in Magnus and Callender (2003).
Attempts to counter Howson’s argument have been of two kinds. Some
defenders of the NMA have generally disputed the adequacy of a Bayesian
perspective on the NMA. Worrall (2007) has argued that the abductive
character of the NMA cannot be accounted for by a Bayesian reconstruction.
In a similar vein, Psillos (2009) has argued that the subjective character of
priors is at variance with the spirit of realist reasoning. Therefore, according
to Psillos, critically analysing a realist argument in a Bayesian framework
that involves prior probabilities amounts to begging the question by choosing
an anti-realist point of view from the start. Howson (2013) highlighted an
inherent problem of this argumentative strategy. In direct response to Psillos
(2009) he pointed out that (i) a Bayesian perspective can in principle be
based on an objective concept of prior probabilities, which is not anti-realist
on any account, and (ii) rejecting prior probabilities amounts to rejecting
any probabilistic understanding of a commitment to scientific realism. In
the absence of any reference to probabilities, however, it becomes difficult
to explain what is meant by the statement that one believes in scientific
realism.
A second strategy has been to acknowledge the viability of Howson’s analysis
in principle but point to the limits of its range of applicability. As first em-
phasised in Dawid (2008), the NMA can be formulated in two substantially
different forms. Menke (2014) and Henderson (forthcoming) have pointed
out that Howson’s base rate fallacy charge only applies to one of them but
not to the other.1
In this article, we formally spell out the latter position and demonstrate
that the analysis of the NMA can gain substantially from such a full formal
reconstruction. We start with a rehearsal of Howson’s argument in Section
2. Section 3 then specifies two distinct kinds of the NMA which we will call
individual theory-based NMA and frequency-based NMA. In Section 4, we
1A different idea how to enrich the NMA in order to avoid the base rate fallacy has
been presented in Sprenger (2015).
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present a formalisation of frequency-based NMA that demonstrates (i) that
the individual theory-based NMA is a sub-argument of the frequency-based
NMA, (ii) that Howson only reconstructs this sub-argument, and (iii) that
the full frequency-based NMA does not commit the base rate fallacy. In
Section 5, we argue that, while there is a strand in scientific realism that re-
duces the NMA to the individual theory-based NMA, Putnam and Boyd, the
first main exponents of the argument, clearly endorsed the frequency-based
NMA. The final parts of this article utilize the full formal reconstruction of
the NMA to clarify two important points on the nature of the NMA. In Sec-
tion 6, it is explained why the use of subjective priors poses no problem for
the frequency based NMA as a realist argument. Section 7 formally demon-
strates that a core worry with respect to a frequency-based understanding of
the NMA can be dispelled. Section 8 discusses a lottery analogy to support
our argument. Finally, Section 9 sums up the main results of this article.
2 Howson’s Argument
In his book Howson (2000), Colin Howson makes the remarkable claim that
the NMA commits the base-rate fallacy and therefore is invalid on logical
grounds. Howson provides the following Bayesian formalisation of this ar-
gument: Let S be a binary propositional variable with values S: Hypothesis
H is predictively successful, and its negation ¬S. Let T be the binary propo-
sitional variable with values T: H is approximately true, and its negation
¬T. Next, the adherent of the NMA makes two assumptions:
A1: P (S|T) is quite large.
A2: P (S|¬T) < k  1.
A1 states that approximately true theories are typically predictively suc-
cessful, and A2 states that theories that are not at least approximately true
are typically not predictively successful. Note that ¬T is the so-called catch-
all hypothesis. For the sake of the argument, we consider both assumptions
to be uncontroversial, although anti-realists objected to both of them (see,
e.g., Laudan (1981) and Stanford (2006)). The adherent of the NMA then
infers:
C: P (T|S) is large.
As Howson correctly points out, the stated argument commits the base-rate
fallacy: C is only justified if the prior probability P (T) is sufficiently large
as, by Bayes’ Theorem,
P (T|S) = P (S|T)P (T)
P (S|T)P (T) + P (S|¬T)P (¬T) , (1)
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according to which P (T|S) is strictly monotonically increasing as a function
of P (T) with P (T|S) = 0 for P (T) = 0. However, the condition that P (T)
is sufficiently large is not in the set of assumptions {A1,A2}. If it were,
we would beg the question because the truth of a predictively successful
theory would then be derived from the assumption that the truth of the
theory in question is a priori sufficiently probable, which is exactly what an
anti-realist denies.2
3 Two Versions of the NMA
Does Howson’s formal reconstruction constitute a faithful representation of
the NMA? It has been pointed out in Dawid (2008) that two conceptually
distinct versions of the NMA have to be distinguished. They differ with
respect to the issue as to what exactly has to be explained by the realist
conjecture.3
The first version is the following: We consider one specific predictively suc-
cessful scientific theory. The approximate truth of that theory is then de-
ployed for explaining why it is predictively successful. We shall call a NMA
based on individual predictive success an individual theory-based NMA. Ac-
cording to the second version, what is to be explained by the realist con-
jecture is the observation that theories which are developed and held by
scientists tend to be predictively successful. In this version, the NMA does
not rely on the observation that one specific theory is predictively successful
but rather on an observed characteristic of science as a whole or at least
on a more narrowly specified segment of science. Theories that are part
of that segment, such as theories that are part of mature science or that
are part of a specific mature research field, are expected to be predictively
successful. We will call a NMA based on the frequency of predictive success
frequency-based NMA.4 Menke (2014) and Henderson (forthcoming) have
2Howson (2015) indeed calls the statement ’one should endorse the truth of an em-
pirically confirmed theory if one believes P (T) > P (S|¬T)’ the only valid conclusion
from NMA-like reasoning. However, since no reason for believing the stated relation
is given, this form of “NMA” cannot seriously be called an argument for scientific re-
alism. As an aside, we note that Howson’s point is false: P (T) > P (S|¬T) and the
fact that P (T|S) is strictly monotonically increasing as a function of P (T) imply that
P (T|S) > P (S|T)/ [P (S|T) + P (¬S|¬T)]. Hence, P (T|S) > 1/2 holds only if one addi-
tionally requires that P (S|T) +P (S|¬T) > 1. This inequality does not follow from the set
of assumptions {A1,A2}.
3In Dawid (2008), the two forms of the NMA are called “analytic NMA” and “epistemic
NMA”.
4A related but different distinction between two forms of NMA was made in Barnes
(2003). Barnes calls the argument from a theory’s success the “miraculous theory argu-
ment” and contrasts it with the “miraculous choice argument” from the scientists’ actual
development and choice of successful theories. The miraculous theory argument is nec-
essarily an individual theory-based NMA, since it presumes the predictive success of the
individual theory under consideration. Therefore, no frequency of predictive success can
4
pointed out that Howson’s argument only addresses what we call individ-
ual theory-based NMA. The frequency-based version of the NMA is not
adequately represented by Howson’s reconstruction.
In the following section, we develop a Bayesian formalisation of frequency-
based NMA and therefore provide the basis for a fully formalised analysis
of the NMA. This will help us to investigate how and to what extent the
frequency-based version of the NMA reaches beyond Howson’s reconstruc-
tion.
4 Formalising the Frequency-Based NMA
To begin with, we specify a scientific discipline or research field R.5 We
count all nE theories in R that have been empirically tested and determine
the number nS of theories that were empirically successful. We can thus
state the following observation:
O: nS out of nE theories in R were predictively successful.
Now let us assume that we are confronted with a new and so far empirically
untested theory H in R. We want to extract the probability P (S|O) for the
predictive success S of H given observation O.
We then assume that each new theory that comes up in R can be treated
as a random pick with respect to predictive success. That is, we assume
that there is a certain overall rate of predictively successful theories in R
and that, in the absence of further knowledge, the success chances of a new
theory should be estimated according to our best estimate R of that success
rate:
P (S|O) = R (2)
R will be based on observation O. The most straightforward assessment of
R is to use the frequentist information and to identify R with
Rfreq =
nS
nE
. (3)
We will adopt it in the remainder.6
be specified within the framework of the miraculous theory argument. A miraculous choice
argument may be either of the individual theory or of the frequency-based type.
5One might argue that a strong statement on predictive success in a research field R
always requires the specification of some conditions C that separate more promising from
less promising theories in the field. However, accounting for this additional step does not
affect the basic structure of the argument, which is why, in order to keep things simple,
we won’t explicitly mention these conditions in our reconstruction.
6A fully Bayesian analysis that extracts R by updating on the individual instances of
predictive success and predictive failure (and converges towards the frequentist result in
the large nE limit) is possible but requires some conceptual effort. We don’t carry it out
here in order to keep things simple.
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To proceed with our formal analysis of the frequency based-NMA, we need
to make two assumptions similar to A1 and A2:
AO1 : P (S|T,O) is quite large.
AO2 : P (S|¬T,O) < k  1
Note that scientific realists assume that the truth of H is the dominating
element in explaining the theory’s predictive success. If that is so, then S is
roughly conditionally independent of O given T and we have P (S|T,O) ≈
P (S|T) and P (S|¬T,O) ≈ P (S|¬T). The conditionsAO1 andAO2 can then be
roughly equated with the conditions A1 and A2. For the sake of generality,
we will nevertheless use conditions AO1 and A
O
2 in the following analysis.
Let us now come to our crucial point, viz. to show that accounting for ob-
servation O blocks the base-rate fallacy. The base-rate fallacy in individual
theory-based NMA consisted in disregarding the possibility of arbitrarily
small priors P (T). In frequency-based NMA, however, the crucial probabil-
ity is P (T|O) rather than P (T). Updating the probability of S on observa-
tion O has an impact on P (T|O). To see this, we start with the law of total
probability,
P (S|O) = P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O)P (¬T|O), (4)
and obtain
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O) . (5)
(The proof is in Appendix A.1.) Two points can be extracted from eq. (5)
and assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 . First, we conclude that
P (S|T,O) ≥ P (S|O). (6)
In particular,
P (S|T,O) = P (S|O) iff P (T|O) = 1. (7)
Second, we obtain that
P (T|O) > P (S|O)− k = R− k . (8)
(The proof is in Appendix A.2.) Hence, P (T|O) is bounded from below if
k < R. Since k is very small by assumption AO2 , this puts only moderate
constraints on R ≈ nS/nE . (See also the discussion on the size of R in
Section 7). If a supporter of the NMA analyses a research context where
k < R is satisfied, then the base-rate fallacy is avoided. Note that the first
and crucial inference in frequency-based NMA is made before accounting for
the predictive success of H itself and relies on relating P (S|O) to P (T|O)
based on the law of total probability.
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Once H has been empirically tested and found to be empirically successful,
we can, just as in the case of individual theory-based NMA, update on S,
the predictive success of H.7 Using eqs. (6) and (7) and the identity
P (T|S,O) = P (S|T,O)
P (S|O) · P (T|O), (9)
it is easy to see that Bayesian updating from P (T|O) to P (T|S,O) further
increases the probability of T for predictively successful theories as long as
P (T|O) < 1.
Comparing this formalization of frequency-based NMA with Howson’s re-
construction, we see that Howson only reconstructs the second part of
frequency-based NMA, which leads from P (T|O) to P (T|S,O). He leaves
out the part where P (T|O) is extracted from the observed success frequency
nS/nE based on the prior P (T). Howson’s base rate fallacy charge crucially
relies on the understanding that the specification of the probability of theory
H before updating under the predictive success of H is not part of the NMA.
Howson’s reconstruction thus is insensitive to the observed frequency of pre-
dictive success and amounts to a formalization of individual theory-based
NMA.
We want to conclude this section with a clarificatory note on the status of the
suggested formalisation. If a scientific realist asserts that trusted theories
in a given research field (see footnote 5) show a significant frequency of
predictive success, she thereby expresses her understanding that an overall
appraisal of the field justifies such a claim. Her assessment is typically based
on a blend of her knowledge of the way scientists perceive the reliability of
trusted theories in their field and her own historical knowledge about that
field. She normally is not in the situation to back up her claim by providing
a complete count of the successful and failed theories in the field based on
precise criteria for what counts as a theory. The presented formalisation does
not suggest that scientific realists must provide an actual count of theories
any more than Bayesian confirmation theory suggests that scientists must
carry out Bayesian updating from explicitly specified priors of their theories.
The role of a formalisation of the presented kind can only be to clarify the
logical structure of a given line of reasoning by offering a well-defined formal
model of it.
5 Do Realists Use Frequency-Based NMA?
The NMA has a long and chequered history. Who among its exponents
endorsed individual theory-based NMA and who endorsed its frequency-
7Note that the predictive success of H will change the value of R. However, this change
will be small if nE is large.
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based counterpart? Here is the precise wording of Hilary Putnam’s famous
first formulation of NMA:
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philos-
ophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle. That
terms in mature science typically refer [. . . ], that the theories
in a mature science are typically true, that the same term can
refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theo-
ries – these statements are viewed by the scientific realist not
as necessary truths but as the only scientific explanation of the
success of science and hence as part of any adequate scientific
description of science and its relations to its objects. (Putnam
1975, our emphasis)
Note that Putnam speaks of the success of science rather than of the success
of an individual scientific theory. He clearly understands the success of
science as a general and observable phenomenon. Since he obviously would
not want to say that each and every scientific theory is always predictively
successful, he thereby asserts that we find a high success rate nS/nE based on
our observations of the history of (mature) science. He then infers from the
success of science that mature scientific theories are typically approximately
true. That is, he infers P (T|O) from the observed rate nS/nE . We conclude
that Putnam presented a clear-cut frequency-based version of NMA.
The other early main exponent of the NMA, Richard Boyd (see, e.g., Boyd
(1984) and Boyd (1985)), is committed to frequency-based NMA as well.
Boyd emphasises that only what he calls the “predictive reliability of well-
confirmed scientific theories” and the “reliability of scientific methodology
in identifying predictively reliable theories” provides the basis for the NMA.
In other words, an individual case of having predictive success could be
explained by good luck and therefore would not license a NMA. Only the
reliability of generating predictive success in a field, i.e. a high frequency of
predictive success, provides an acceptable basis for the NMA.
Later expositions of NMA at times are not sensitive to the distinction be-
tween individual theory-based NMA and frequency-based NMA and there-
fore are not clearly committed to one or the other version of the argument.
In some cases, Putnam’s phrase “success of science” is used at one stage
of the exposition while the thrust of the exposition seems to endorse an
individual theory-based NMA perspective. A classic example of this kind
is Musgrave (1988). Psillos (2009) defends individual theory-based NMA in
his attempt to refute Howson’s criticism of the NMA.
6 Subjective Priors and Scientific Realism
At this point we want to return to the issue of subjective priors. As de-
scribed in the introduction, Psillos has argued that the reliance of Bayesian
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confirmation theory on subjective priors renders it inherently anti-realist
from the start. A similar point has been raised by Brian Skyrms (private
communication) and arguably has generated doubts about the relevance of
Howson’s argument among a number of exponents of the scientific realism
debate.
The core of the argument is the following. Bayesian confirmation relies on
prior probabilities of the hypotheses under scrutiny. In other words, in a
Bayesian framework even the most convincing set of empirical data leads
to an endorsement of the tested hypothesis only for a given range of priors.
This means that a (subjective) Bayesian analysis always allows for avoiding
a given conclusion by choosing sufficiently low priors for the hypothesis in
question. Why should this be a lethal problem for (individual theory-based)
NMA when it isn’t for scientific reasoning, which can be reconstructed in
Bayesian terms as well?
In order to answer this objection to Howson’s argument, one has to take a
look at the reason why, from a Bayesian perspective, science can reach stable
and more or less objective conclusions despite the necessity of starting from
subjective priors. The reason is that, in standard scientific contexts, pos-
teriors converge under repeated empirical testing. Therefore, if one wants
to test a hypothesis, any prior probability that may be chosen in advance
(apart from dogmatic denial, which corresponds to a prior probability of
zero), can lead to posteriors beyond a probability threshold set for acknowl-
edging conclusive confirmation if a sufficient amount of data is collected.
The fact that science is modelled as allowing for an infinite series of em-
pirical testing therefore neutralises the threat of subjective priors to the
reliability of scientific claims.
Howson’s claim that the NMA involves a base rate fallacy in this light
amounts to the claim that the evidence structure that enters the NMA is not
of the kind to be found in scientific testing. It does not project a series of
updatings under a sequence of observations like in scientific testing. Rather,
it relies on acknowledging exactly one characteristic of a given theory: its
novel predictive success. In Howson’s reconstruction of the NMA, there is
only one updating under the observation of predictive success. This, How-
son argues, is no adequate structure for establishing the hypothesis under
scrutiny as long as no limits to the priors are assumed. Since no anti-realist
would subscribe to such limits, the (individual theory-based) NMA cannot
establish scientific realism.
Understood in this way, Howson makes a crucial point about the individual
theory-based NMA. The problem of individual theory-based NMA is not
that the sample size happens to be 1. The problem runs deeper: individual
theory-based NMA does not provide a framework for the sample testing of
a rate of predictive success at all. The logic of the argument starts with
selecting a theory that is known to have made correct novel predictions.
The argument is not based on an observation about the research process
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that has led up to developing and endorsing scientific theories but only on
an observation about the theory’s relation to empirical data. One could
face a situation where the sheer number of theories that were developed
statistically implies a high probability that, among all those theories, one
predictively successful can be found. To use an analogy, if one selects the
winning ticket of a lottery after the draw, the fact that it won is no surprise.
Since the individual theory based NMA selects the predictively successful
theory ex post, it does not distinguish whether or not a situation of this
kind applies. Therefore, it provides no basis for establishing whether the
predictive success of the given theory is “a miracle” or, given that it was
selected for its predictive success, is no surprise at all.
Frequency-based NMA, to the contrary, relies on an observation about the
research process: within a given field, scientific theories that satisfy a given
set of conditions happen to be predictively successful with a significantly
high probability. This observation is grounded in a series of individual ob-
servations of the predictive successes of individual theories. The empirical
testing of each theory serves as a new data point. The observation O of
a certain frequency of predictive success therefore is the result of a quasi-
scientific testing series. The probability P (T|O), which is extracted from
O based on the law of total probability, can be decoupled from the prior
probability P (T) as it is inferred from a quasi-scientific testing series. The
mechanism of objectifying results that work in a scientific framework is also
applicable in the case of NMA: anyone who takes the available data to be
inconclusive can resort to further testing.
Specifically, if a certain number of data points are available for extracting O
and an anti-realist observer (who has a very low prior P (T) before observ-
ing predictive success in the field but, for the sake of the argument, accepts
conditions AO1 and A
O
2 ) considers the available amount of data too small for
overcoming her very small prior probability P (T), one can just wait for new
theories in the research context to get tested. If the additional data also sup-
ports a high frequency of predictive success, our anti-realist would at some
stage acknowledge that the empirical data has established realism.8 The
deep reason why frequency-based NMA avoids the base rate fallacy there-
fore lies in the fact that it provides a framework in which the convergence
behaviour of posteriors under repeated updating can be exploited.
8The present analysis implies that the proposal by Menke (2014) to use NMA only
with respect to theories that show multiple predictive successes is not satisfactory. Since
Menke’s suggestion remains within the framework of individual theory-based NMA, it
does not solve the structural problem Howson is pointing to. A theory that happens to
make two novel predictions and is successful in both cases may be more likely to be true
than one with only one case of novel predictive success (albeit one may object to treating
instances of novel predictive success statistically as independent picks as it is proposed by
Menke). But individual theories just give us the predictions they happen to imply. There
is no perspective of a series of novel predictions that can be understood in terms of an
open series of empirical testing. Howson’s core objection thus remains valid.
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7 Does NMA need a high Frequency of Predictive
Success?
References to success frequencies in the context of the NMA have been
avoided by a number of philosophers of science for one reason: it seemed
imprudent to ground an argument for realism on a claim that looked ques-
tionable. Given the many failures of scientific theories, it looked unconvinc-
ing to assert a high frequency of predictive success in any scientific field.
In this light, it is important to have a clear understanding of the success
frequencies that are actually required for having a convincing NMA. In the
following, we address this question within our formalised reconstruction.
The strength of the NMA is expressed by P (T|S,O). In order to make a
strong case for scientific realism, we demand that
P (T|S,O) > K, (10)
where K is some reasonably high probability value. K = 1/2 may be viewed
as a plausible condition for taking the NMA seriously. We now ask: How
does a condition on P (T|S,O) translate into a condition on P (S|O) and
therefore on the (observed) success frequency R? Obviously, this depends
on the posited values of P (S|T,O) and P (S|¬T,O). Eqs. (5) and (9) imply
that
P (T|S,O) = P (S|T,O)
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
)
. (11)
We know already that the NMA works only for P (S|O) < P (S|T,O). From
eq. (11) we can further infer that, for fixed P (S|O) and fixed P (S|¬T,O) <
P (S|O), P (T|S,O) decreases with increasing P (S|T,O). (The proof is in
Appendix A.3.) Therefore, it is most difficult for P (T|S,O) to reach the
value K if P (S|T,O) has the maximal value 1. It thus makes sense to focus
on this case, which gives
P (T|S,O) = 1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
. (12)
Condition (10) then turns into
1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
> K, (13)
which leads to the following condition for P (S|O):
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K +K · P (S|¬T,O) (14)
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(The proof is in Appendix A.4.) For small P (S|¬T,O), a good approxima-
tion of the condition expressed in eq. (14) is
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K . (15)
For K = 1/2, we thus obtain
P (S|O) > 2P (S|¬T,O). (16)
In the large nE-limit, this implies
nS/nE > 2P (S|¬T,O). (17)
We thus see that we don’t need a high rate of predictive success in a scientific
field for having a significant argument in favour of scientific realism. The
ratio nS/nE may be small as long as it is larger than the assumed value
of P (S|¬T,O). In a sense, the understanding that the NMA needs a high
frequency of predictive success is based on the inverse mistake to the one
committed by the endorser of the individual theory-based NMA. While the
latter only focuses on the updating under the novel predictive success of an
individual theory, the former does not take this updating into account.
The possibility to base a NMA on a small ratio nS/nE is significant. Many
arguments and observations which lower our assessments of nS/nE in a sci-
entific field at the same time enter our assessment of P (S|¬T,O). Take,
for example, the following argument against a high ratio of predictive suc-
cess. “Scientists develop many theories which they don’t find promising
themselves. Clearly, those theories have a very low frequency of predic-
tive success.” It is equally clear, though, that most of these theories are
false and therefore lower P (S|¬T,O). Examples of this kind show that lines
of reasoning that isolate segments of the theory space where both nS/nE
and P (S|¬T,O) are very small provide a framework in which the claim
nS/nE > P (S|¬T,O) can make sense even if the overall value nS/nE in a
research field is rather unimpressive.
8 An Analogy
In conjunction, the analysis of Section 6 and the possibility to base a
frequency-based NMA on low success frequencies have an important con-
sequence: lines of reasoning that at first glance look like exemplifications of
individual theory-based NMA may allow for a frequency based understand-
ing and can be made valid on that basis. In the following, we discuss this
case in detail by spelling out the analogy between the NMA and the lottery
case that was already mentioned in Section 6.
Let us look at the case of a lottery with one draw and 106 numbered tickets.
Each individual participant i has a fair winning chance of P (Wi) = 10
−6.
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Let us assume that the lottery had the outcome WI that participant I got
the winning ticket. Let us further assume that some observers develop the
hypothesis T that the lottery is rigged and an employee has given away the
winning number to someone in advance. One of those observers addresses
person I and asks him: “the probability that you would win without fraud
was 10−6. What other explanation than fraud could explain your win?”
The correct formal Bayesian response to that observer is: “You fell prey to
the base rate fallacy. Since you have not specified the prior probability of
fraud, your argument is invalid.” Another way to respond is: “You did not
even check whether the outcome of the lottery was unlikely. In order to do
so you have to look at the overall winning rate for sold tickets. If all 106
tickets were sold that rate is 10−6 and there is nothing unusual about the
process whatsoever.”
The two responses can be related to each other by considering an assessment
of the probability of fraud in the lottery. Someone who takes lottery fraud
to be a priori unlikely assumes that the prior probability P (T) that the
winning number was given away at all is small, let us say 1%. The prior
probability for the hypothesis Ti that a randomly specified individual buyer
i was involved in a fraud is therefore of the order P (Ti) = 10
−2/(number of
buyers). If all tickets were sold, that prior probability is P (Ti) = 10
−2 ×
10−6 = 10−8. In other words, the very high number of sold tickets leads to
a very low prior P (Ti) of fraudulent behaviour by an individual buyer. This
turns committing the base rate fallacy into a disastrous mistake. We assume
P (Wi|Ti) = 1: if the person fraudulently got the winning number, she is
sure to win; and we have already specified P (Wi|¬T) = 10−6: if the lottery
is fair, the winning chance of a participant i is 10−6. We then extract the
total probability P (Wi) = P (Wi|Ti)P (Ti) + P (Wi|¬Ti)P (¬Ti) ' 10−8 +
10−6 ' 10−6. Bayesian updating under the observation WI that buyer
I won the lottery then gives P (TI|WI) = P (TI)/P (WI) = 10−2. Given
that only one ticket won and P (Ti|¬Wi) = 0, this is equal to the posterior
probability P (T|WI) that fraud occurred in this lottery at all. We find
P (T|WI) = P (T) = 10−2. Committing the base rate fallacy thus led our
observer to believe that the outcome of the lottery strongly supported fraud
even though fraud remained as improbable as it had been before the lottery
results were announced.
Let us now transform our example into a case of the individual theory based
NMA. We carry out the following transformation:
• Buyer i → theory h
• (Number of lottery tickets)−1 → chances of a false theory’s predictive
success
• Number of sold tickets → number of theories developed
• Wi: i is drawn in the lottery → Sh: theory h is predictively successful
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• T: The lottery is rigged → T: the theory is approximately true
To keep the analogy perfect, we assume P (Sh|Th) = 1: the approximately
true theory is certain to be predictively successful. What we get is an
explication of how the individual theory based NMA commits the base rate
fallacy (with arbitrary choices of numbers, obviously).
Let us assume that a theory H has predictive success to an extent that had
the probability P (SH|¬TH) = 10−6 if the theory were not true,. Scientific
realists develop the hypothesis T that a predictively successful theory H is
most often approximately true. Exponents of the individual theory-based
NMA point to theory H and ask: “The probability that the theory is predic-
tively that successful without being approximately true is 10−6. What other
explanation than the theory’s approximate truth could explain its predictive
success?”
The correct formal Bayesian response to the exponent of individual theory-
based NMA is: “You fell prey to the base rate fallacy. Since you have not
specified the prior probability of the theory’s approximate truth, your ar-
gument is invalid.” Another way to respond is: “You did not even check
whether the occurrence of predictive success of the observed degree is un-
likely. In order to do so you have to look at the overall rate of predictive
success. If the number of theories that have been developed in science is
106 there is nothing unusual about the fact that a theory with the observed
degree of predictive success is among them.”
The two answers can be related to each other by considering an assessment
of the probability of approximately true theories in science. Let us take the
scientific anti-realist to assume that the probability P (T ) that there is a
known theory in science that is approximately true is small, let us say 1%.
The probability P (Th) that a random theory, irrespectively of its success,
is true therefore is of the order 10−2/(number of theories that have been
developed). If the number of theories that were developed is 106, P (Th) =
10−8. Based on P (Sh|Th) = 1 and P (SH|¬TH) = 10−6, we can write the
total probability P (Sh) = P (Th)P (Sh|Th) + P (¬Th)P (Sh|¬Th) ' 10−8 +
10−6 ' 10−6. Bayesian updating under the observation SH that theory H
was predictively successful then gives P (TH|SH) = P (TH)/P (SH) = 10−2.
If H was the only theory that had novel predictive success, our assumption
P (Th|¬Sh) = 0 implies that P (T|SH) = P (T) = 10−2. Committing the
base rate fallacy thus has lead the exponent of the individual theory based
NMA to believe that the predictive success of H strongly supports scientific
realism even though scientific realism has remained as improbable as it was
before the predictive success of H was observed.
We know already that the base rate fallacy can be avoided by formulating
the NMA in a frequency-based way. What we can see in our example,
however, is that this may even happen if the number of known predictively
successful theories is just 1. Going back to the lottery case, sophisticated
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observers might indeed check how many tickets were sold and find out that
the number was just 10. This means that the outcome that there was a
winning ticket at all was indeed very improbable, namely 10−5. Updating on
the observation that there was a winning ticket then does strongly increase
the fraud probability. Assuming an a priori overall fraud probability of
10−2 now indeed leads to the conclusion that fraud is very probable. A
“scientific” test of the fraud hypothesis can only be carried out, however,
if the fraud is systematic and occurs again in future lotteries. Only then a
staunch believer in the purity of lotteries could be convinced of the fraud
hypothesis by establishing a rate of wins in the lottery that is systematically
too high.
Translating this into the NMA scenario, the exponent of the frequency-
based NMA may argue that the probability of a false theory’s stunning
predictive success would be so small that such stunning success is unlikely
to have occurred at all in the history of science. Even if this just involves
one example of predictive success, it is a frequency-based argument and
thus avoids the base rate fallacy. In order to be trustworthy, however, the
defender of the NMA must be ready to wait for further examples of similarly
stunning predictive success in science. If no other case ever occurred, the
significance of the first instance of stunning predictive success would at some
stage wane and the early stunning success would have to be viewed as a
statistical fluke.
9 Conclusions
The following picture of the role of the base rate fallacy with respect to the
NMA has emerged. Howson’s argument decisively destroys the individual
theory-based NMA, which has been endorsed by some adherents to NMA
and clearly was not understood to be logically flawed by many others. This
is an important step towards a clearer understanding of the NMA and the
scientific realism debate as a whole. However, the individual theory-based
NMA is only one part of the NMA as it was presented by Putnam and
Boyd. The full argument, which we call the frequency-based NMA, does
not commit the base rate fallacy.
A clearer understanding of what the base rate fallacy amounts to in the
context of the NMA can be achieved by phrasing it in terms of the conver-
gence behaviour of posteriors. An argument commits the base rate fallacy
if it (i) ignores the role of the subjective priors and (ii) does not offer a
perspective of convergence behaviour under an always extendable sequence
of updatings under incoming data. The individual theory-based NMA is
structurally incapable of providing such a sequence of updatings because
it addresses only the spectrum of novel predictions provided by one single
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theory.9 Even worse, it does not consider the success frequency at all and
therefore offers no basis whatsoever for taking the observed predictive suc-
cess to be unlikely. The frequency-based NMA, to the contrary, is based on a
general observation about the research process (the frequency of predictive
success in a research field) that can be tested by collecting a sequence of
data points where each data point corresponds to the observed novel predic-
tive success of an individual theory. That sequence can always be extended
by taking new theories into account. Therefore, the process of testing the
hypothesis “theories that have novel predictive success are probably true”
under the assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 is of the same type as scientific testing
and does not commit the base rate fallacy.
One worry about the frequency-based NMA is related to the understand-
ing that the high frequencies of predictive success necessary for having a
convincing NMA cannot be found in actual science. The formalisation of
the frequency-based NMA demonstrates that such high frequencies are not
necessary for achieving high truth probabilities with respect to theories with
novel predictive success.
To end with, let us emphasise one important point. This article has shown
that the NMA, if correctly reconstructed, does not commit the base-rate
fallacy and does not require a high overall frequency of predictive success.
Those results are not sufficient for demonstrating the soundness of the NMA,
however. A supporter of the frequency-based NMA must justify assumptions
AO1 and A
O
2 and must still explain on which grounds she takes a sufficiently
high frequency of predictive success to be borne out by the data. Whether
or not that can be achieved lies beyond the scope of this article.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (5)
We use the law of total probability and obtain:
P (S|O) = P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O)P (¬T|O)
= P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O) · [1− P (T|O)]
= P (T|O) · [P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)] + P (S|¬T,O)
Hence,
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O) .
Here we have used that P (S|T,O) > P (S|¬T,O), which follows from as-
sumptions AO1 and A
O
2 .
A.2 Derivation of Eq. (8)
We start with eq. (5) and obtain
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
≥ P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
≥ P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O) (18)
> P (S|O)− k. (19)
Here eq. (18) follows from assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 and eq. (19) follows
from assumption AO2 .
A.3 Proof of the Remark Following Eq. (11)
We start with eq. (11) and assume that α := P (S|O) and β := P (S|¬T,O)
are fixed with α > β. Next we set y := P (T|S,O) and x := P (S|T,O).
Then:
y =
α− β
α
· x
x− β (20)
We now differentiate y by x and obtain
dy
dx
= −α− β
α
· β
(x− β)2 < 0. (21)
Hence y (i.e. P (T|S,O)) is a decreasing function of x (i.e. P (S|T,O)).
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A.4 Derivation of Eq. (14)
We start with eq. (13) and obtain in a sequence of transformations:
1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
> K
1
P (S|O) · (P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)) > K (1− P (S|¬T,O))
1− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|O) > K (1− P (S|¬T,O))
1−K (1− P (S|¬T,O)) > P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|O)
Hence,
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K +K · P (S|¬T,O) .
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